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CAROL M. ROSE*
Left Brain, Right Brain and History
in the New Law and Economics of
Property
These two excellent papers reflect a kind of yin and yang ofproperty: Michael Heller is in a quest to unlock the "left-
brain" rational categories by which we organize our thinking
about property; Peter Huang searches for the grounds of our
deep "right-brain" emotional responses to property. Both pa-
pers are written in an analytic mode, and I have very little quar-
rel with either on that count. Following a few comments on the
major points in each, however, I will argue that in the case of
both left and right brain-rational categories and emotional re-
sponse-the analytic power of the argument borrows from par-
ticular historical instantiations of property, and that these two
excellent analyses might be deepened diachronically, taking into
account the narrative context into which the analytic elements.
are embedded.
I
LEFT-BRAINED PROPERTY: MICHAEL HELLER AND
TIlE STANDARD CATEGORIES OF PROPERTY
Michael Heller argues very powerfully that our categories for
reasoning about property are outdated, if indeed these categories
were ever very useful. In his view, an unholy categorical trinity
of "private property, public property, and commons" hinders our
understanding of the real functions and characteristics of prop-
erty. He proposes to change this dismal picture by constructing
new categories, by reintegrating parts of others, and by redefin-
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ing still others, and he gives us a new chart showing the ways in
which these various tactics might play out.
Now, creating charts is a game that many can play, and while
Heller's chart has considerable force, I am going to propose a
somewhat different one, but one that I think better captures the
point that Heller is making about property.
First, my chart has a horizontal axis that looks like this:
FIGURE 1
I
I O~EregAnticommons II--------------------i (tragedy of the
commons)
This horizontal axis represents a continuum from "anticom-
mons" on the far left, a state of unlimited exclusion, no access, to
"open access" on the far right, a state of unlimited access, no ex-
clusion. Though Heller is modest about it, he is the chief publi-
cist for the term "anticommons," a situation in which so many
people have the right to exclude that a resource winds up not
being used at all, because all of the rights-holders have the power
to prevent all others from gaining access. 1 Heller himself has
very creatively taken the "constructive" approach (to use his ter-
minology) in taking up this hitherto little-used term; the numer-
ous citations to his new conception show how right he is that the
world is ready for this new term.2
On the other end of this horizontal axis I place the term "open
access," or what Garrett Hardin called the "tragedy of the com-
mons."3 Here I need to take up a slight quibble with Heller's
language. Heller uses the term "commons" ambiguously, as Har-
din did, sometimes mixing up the concept of a commonly-held
group property with the concept of open access. For several
years, however, the political scientist Elinor Ostrom has led a
charge against this mix-up, arguing very forcefully that these are
very different matters indeed.4 The commonly held group prop-
1 Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998).
2 As of November 8, 2000, Lexis lists 66 articles (excluding Heller's original arti-
cle) citing "anticommons" since the publication of Heller's 1998 study, as opposed to
one mention previously, in Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J.
1315, 1322 n.22 (1993). Heller credits Frank Michelman for the original usage in
1983; see Heller, supra note 1, at 623 n.7.
3 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
4 ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITU-
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erty (or CPR, for "common pool resource"), she says, is not nec-
essarily tragic at all; indeed institutions to manage CPRs in
fisheries, forestry, grazing and agriculture have in fact persisted
and thrived over very, very long periods of time-even the very
common field system that Hardin tried to use as a bad example.s
Such CPRs are, after all, property, even though owned by a
group, and a group may be entirely capable of managing its prop-
erty in a sustainable way. Ostrom argues that Hardin's "tragedy"
occurs not in these CPRs, but rather in what she calls open access
resources, in which all comers are free to use the resource but no
one can exclude anyone else.6 Hence I place Ostrom's "open ac-
cess" at the far right of my spectrum. In Heller's terminology,
Ostrom has helped us to understand property by the strategy of
"redefining" and "reintegrating" our categories. The large num-
ber of legal citations to her work shows how ready the world has
been for her creative changes to the canonical categories as welU
But somewhere between these tragic extremes-unlimited ex-
clusion/no access, unlimited access/no exclusion-there lies the
category of usable property, where use is compatible with exclu-
sion. It is at that point that I place my vertical line:
nONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 23 (1990) (describing "disastrous" effects of think-
ing that limited commons is the same as open access); see also Alison Rieser,
Prescriptions for the Commons: Environmental Scholarship and the Fishing Quotas
Debate,23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 393, 399-400 (1999) (reviewing critiques by Os-
trom and others of the "tragedy of the commons").
5 See generally Ostrom, supra note 4; Susan Jane Buck Cox, No Tragedy on the
Commons, 7 ENVTL. ETHICS 49 (1985); CARL J. DAHLMAN, THE OPEN FIELD SyS-
TEM AND BEYOND: A PROPERTY RIGHTS ANALYSIS OF AN ECONOMIC INSTITUTION
(1980).
6 Ostrom, supra note 4, at 23.
7 For law reviews alone, Lexis lists 124 articles citing this work as of November 8,
2000.
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My vertical line intersects with the horizontal at a midpoint
that we generally consider "property." At this midpoint a re-
source can be subject to effective ownership because the owner
can both exclude outsiders and use the resource. But along this
vertical line lie different kinds of owners: the owner of the re-
source may be an individual (the upper extreme), or some collec-
tivity (the lower extreme).
There is an enormous rhetoric about the uppermost category
on the vertical, that is, individual property-so much, in fact, that
individually-owned property seems to some to be synonymous
with "property" itself. That, in fact, was Hardin's mistake when
he suggested that "property" could only be individual whereas
"common" resources were tantamount to being up for grabs.
But even Hardin paid attention to-and critized-one form of
collective property, namely property of the state, or public prop-
erty, i.e. property such as parks, streets, squares, and sewage
treatment plants, all owned and managed by organized govern-
mental institutions.8
Between these extremes along the vertical, however, there are
many other forms of collective property, and here I will fill in the
chart a bit more:
8 Hardin, supra note 3, at 1245.
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Collective Property <larger groups)
--family property
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commons: patent pools. condominiums,
etc, "liberal commons"
--vague, judicially managed commons:
riparian rights systems. owners within
ambit of nuisance suits
--public property: parks, streets, military
bases etc.
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As this chart suggests, between the property of individuals (or
small numbers of individuals like joint tenancy) and public prop-
erty, there are a lot of collective but non-public forms of prop-
erty. This intermediate range represents an area of property that
has been only recently explored in much depth; perhaps for that
reason, the terminology is a mess. For customary, community-
based property, Ostrom uses the term "CPR" as a shortcut for
"common pool resource," but others have used this shortcut to
mean "common property regime."9 Still others designate this
kind of common property as "community-based management,"l0
and Henry Smith has added the term "semicommons" in a recent
9 See Paul Seabright, Managing Local Commons: Theoretical Issues in Incentive
Design, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Fall 1993, at 113, 114 n.1 (discussing terminology).
10 See, e.g., Martin S. Weinstein, Pieces of the Puzzle: Solutions for Community-
Based Fisheries Management from Native Canadians, Japanese Cooperatives, and
Common Property Researchers, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 375, 380-83 (2000);
Gregory F. Maggio, Recognizing the Vital Role of Local Communities in Interna-
tional Legal Instruments for Conserving Biodiversity, 16 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. &
POL'y 179, 195-96 (1997/1998); Alison Rieser, Property Rights and Ecosystem Man-
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article about medieval scattered fieldsY Heller tells us that he
and Hanoch Dagan are adding a new category, the "liberal com-
mons,"12 and I have added to the mess by talking about "limited
common properties" (LCPs), encompassing both the customary
and the "liberal" versions of common properties.B One might
be depressed about this welter of names, but I am not; it suggests
the enormous dynamism in current scholarship of non-govern-
mental common property ownership.
What is particularly interesting about this intermediate area of
collective but non-public property is the relatively recent interest
property scholars have taken in it. It is odd that this phenome-
non is so new; certainly collective but non-public property is all
around us. Family property is a pervasive form of property own-
ership, but even beyond that, many of us live in co-ops and con-
dominiums, and most of us belong to institutions that collectively
own property-clubs, churches, and the like. Why then have
these intermediate collective property forms been so relatively
little noticed? Why, aside from governmental public property, is
"property" so often equated with individual property?
One reason surely must be the powerful libertarian appeal of
individual property--property seen as that realm in which the in-
dividual has ultimate control, free from any intrusion except by
those that she invites, and in which she is free to express herself
exactly as she wishes.
A second reason comes from economics. Economists, assisted
by game-theoretic thinking, have been skeptical of the ability of
groups of persons to cooperate; if transaction costs do not kill
collective action, then strategic bargaining and prisoners' dilem-
mas wilp4 This anti-collective attitude among economists is now
eroding somewhat, as economically-informed scholars are jump-
ing on board a veritable bandwagon of subjects relating to
"norms."15 The new norms literature dovetails nicely with the
work of Ostrom and her colleagues on CPRs, since all of these
agement in U.S. Fisheries: Contracting for the Commons?, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 813,
816 (1997).
11 Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open
Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 131 (2000).
12 Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J.
(forthcoming Jan. 2001).
13 Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales,
Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 132 (1998).
14 Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 14-20 (1982).
15 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DIS-
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scholars are interested in the ways that customary practices can
serve as the glue that makes group cooperation possible.
A third reason that accounts for the myopia about the interme-
diate forms of property ownership may be particularly American.
Our law has been particularly hostile to most forms of collective
property, particularly those in Ostrom's CPR range. This too is
an interesting puzzle. My own view is that some of this hostility
is a historically self-serving myopia. Our leading case about Na-
tive American property claims is Johnson v. M'[ntosh,16 where it
might have been possible to recognize property in native tribes;
but the Marshall Court, while not completely dismissive of all
Native American claims, ignored the possibility of collective tri-
bal ownershipY The logic seems to have been that the tribes
were not cognizable sovereign governments (hence public prop-
erty was not possible), nor did individual persons in the tribes
have recognizable common-law claims to property.18 Those two
possibilities, individual property and governmental public prop-
erty, appeared to exhaust the Court's idea of what counted as
"property," illustrating Heller's point that our categories have se-
riously-and unjustly-limited our property imagination. While
probably not so intended by Marshall himself, any excuse to ig-
nore native property proved to be highly convenient for settlers.
But aside from self-justifying motivations with respect to tribal
peoples, American courts did have serious and important argu-
ments against custom-based collective property. There is a very
attractive quality about the modern CPR literature's depiction of
community-owned resources and their management systems for
irrigation, forestry, fishing and the like. This is particularly the
case when this literature focuses--as it often does-on traditional
groups, and when it shows how these picturesque and often-ig-
nored peoples have managed to carve out sustainable lives for
themselves. These groups govern themselves and their collective
PUTES (1991); EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS (1977);
Symposium, Law, Economics and Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996).
16 Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
17 The case recognized an undefined claim of "occupancy" in the Indian tribes,
but not full property; the "occupancy" right was not alienable, since it could be ex-
tinguished (by purchase or conquest) only by the United States. Johnson, 21 U.S. at
584-88.
18 The denial of Indian property was an explicit part of the brief for the defend-
ants, Johnson, 21 U.S. at 567-70; and while Marshall verbally brushed it aside in the
Court's opinion, Johnson, 21 U.S. at 588, he could not come up with any category of
property for tribal peoples, aside from the incohate "occupancy."
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properties through customary norms and adherence to tradi-
tional practices, rather than through formal government. It was
precisely this informal, customary governance, however, that
made nineteenth-century American courts cast a jaundiced eye
on this kind of collective property. The judges saw these commu-
nity practices as mired in the swamps of medieval feudalism, hi-
erarchy, and rigidity; in particular, they thought that customary
law was incompatible with democratic forms of government, in
which communities pass laws for themselves not by looking to
the past, but rather by looking to the open actions of democrati-
cally-elected representatives.19
These concerns are not trivial, even today. One much-cited
example of a modern CPR is the lobster-fishing community on
Monhegan Island, described with great relish by James Ache-
son.20 The Monhegan lobstermen police the "perimeter" of their
lobstering grounds, using low-level violence against interloping
outsiders, and they allocate fishing spots among themselves on
the basis of community norms, closely reflecting the individual
standings that come from kinship, residence, and recognized
skill.21 As affectionate and appealing as this portrait may be,
however, it has a downside: from a more skeptical perspective
the Monhegan fishermen look xenophobic, misogynistic,22 and
bullying-characteristics rather reminiscent of the historic Amer-
ican legal concerns about customary law. Indeed, one cannot
help but notice that the international feminist community voices
similar concerns about efforts to devolve governing authority on
fundamentalist religious communities.23 These communities
hardly seem paragons of democratic rule and equal opportunity
either, at least with respect to their internal governance.
On the other hand, American legal institutions have generally
been quite friendly to the category of collective property that
Heller and Dagan call "liberal common property." These are
19 See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inher-
ently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 741-42 (1986).
20 JAMES M. ACHESON, THE LoBSTER GANGS OF MAINE (1988).
21Id. at 44-50 (describing the role of residence), 52-53 (same for skill), 73-77
(describing policing of outsiders, locations of most prestigious fishermen's spots).
22Id. at 74 (describing pejorative use of representation of female genitalia as
warning to encroaching outsiders).
23 See, e.g., Ayelet Shachar, Group Identity and Women's Rights in Family Law:
The Perils of Multicultural Accommodation, 6 J. POLIT. PHILOS. 285 (1998) (describ-
ing how accommodation to minority cultures may lead to repression of women
members within the group).
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non-public common properties in which the members may par-
ticipate in somewhat formalized "private government," and in
which they always retain the ultimate protection of "exit." Un-
like the more custom-driven CPRs, where both new entry and
exit may be quite constrained, in the "liberal common property"
participants can sell their shares and get out. To accommodate
the liberal common property that Heller and Dagan describe,
American legislatures have passed statutes permitting the crea-
tion of such organizations as corporations, condominiums and
cooperatives, and the courts have supplied a body of common
law for their governance.24
Why this difference? My best guess is that the possibility of
exit is the key to the positive response of our legal institutions to
"liberal common property." We are, after all, a nation of immi-
grants, for whom the idea of "exit" has profoundly liberationist
connotations. Add to that attitude the American dream of the
Wild West, the open frontier, the wide open spaces, and one can
easily see how our law might easily smile upon institutions that
enable people to work with others, but to cut and run when
necessary.
All this is to say that there is a story behind the categories in
which we see property. Our collective myopia about certain
forms of common property-our insistence until recently that
those forms of property were either tragic or non-existent-is a
part of a larger narrative about who we are as a nation. There
are some forms of property that we just did not want to notice
until quite recently. Just as interesting is the fact that we are
waking up to them now. Why the burst of interest in traditional-
ist communities and their norms? Are we in the grasp of a fun-
damentally reactionary nostalgia? Or has the Libertarian
distaste for governmental regulation made customary regimes
seem more attractive? Or might the new interest in CPRs and
norms stem from a growing internationalism, including the ex-
tremely belated recognition that tribal and traditionalist peoples
the world over have been the subjects of vicious expropriation, in
part because their holdings and products never counted as "prop-
erty?"25 Those are the narratives in which our categories of
24 See, e.g., UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT (amended 1980), 7 U.L.A. 199 (1997); Hid-
den Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)
(interpreting condominium rules for community governance); Justice Court Mut.
Hous. Coop. v. Sandow, 270 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1966) (same for co-op rules).
25 See Rose, supra note 13, at 139-43, 160-61 (noting past failure to treat tribal
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property are embedded, and they need to be explored. Heller's
illuminating article points out the time-bound character of the
traditional categories. We should turn to history, along with self-
reflection, to understand the stories that we once used to tell our-
selves about property, as well as the ones we are telling ourselves
now.
II
RIGHT-BRAINED PROPERTY: PETER HUANG AND
THE ROLE OF EMOTIONS IN PROPERTY
If Michael Heller's property categories are all about rational
understanding--Ieft-brain thinking, so to speak-Peter Huang's
contribution concerns the right side of the brain, as he builds a
systematic picture of the powerful role of the emotions in prop-
erty bargains. He argues that expectations about property give
rise to emotions, and in turn our emotions give rise to actions
that police our bargaining partners and keep them from violating
our expectations. Here too, I have little to add to a quite fasci-
nating analysis, except to stress that emotional responses to prop-
erty, like our categories of thinking about property, need to be
considered within a narrative or historical framework.
One of the points that Huang makes is that our emotional re-
sponses to property derive from our expectations of entitlement,
and thus expectations of entitlement also lie behind the so-called
"endowment effect," the phenomenon in which owners of prop-
erty value the things that they already have more than they value
the prospect of getting things that they do not have.26 This point,
however, raises a persistent question about the literature on the
endowment effect: just when is it that someone thinks a thing is
within his or her "endowment"?
A classic article on the endowment effect concerned some ex-
periments with people who had been given either coffee cups or
candy bars: the holders of coffee cups valued coffee cups more
highly, while the holders of candy bars valued their candy bars
more highly.27 But this study made the matter far too easy, be-
peoples' products and locations as property, but modern change toward some
recognition).
26 See Peter H. Huang, Reasons within Passions: Emotions and Intentions in Prop-
erty Rights Bargaining, 79 OR. L. REV. 435 (2000).
27 Jack L. Knetsch, The Endowment Effect and Evidence ofNonreversible Indiffer-
ence Curves, 79 AMER. EcoN. REV. 1277 (1989).
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cause with the much-cited coffee cups and candy bars, all the in-
dicia of endowment went in the same direction; possession and
title were united. Unfortunately, the indicators of endowment
diverge all too often in property. Take adverse possession: here,
possession and title go in opposing directions. The would-be ad-
verse possessor is legally a trespasser until a magical statutory
date passes, after which the true owner is barred from asserting
his or her ownership. Oliver Wendell Holmes famously de-
scribed adverse possession as the legal recognition that extended
possession makes you think of a thing as in some way "tak[ing]
root in your being."28 But when does the thing become so
rooted? And does the thing ever really take root in this way if
you know that someone else is the true owner? Judges and juries
don't think so. They evidently think that if the trespasser knows
his or her legal status and trespasses anyway, title should not be
awarded to the trespasser even after the magical date passes; as
Richard Helmholz showed, trial courts are forgiving to good faith
trespassers, but they do not take kindly to people who knowingly
barge in on other people's property.29 Similar questions arise
with constitutional "takings" claims: one might think that endow-
ment effects explain an owner's emotional response to a regula-
tory cutback on some land use. Unfortunately, this begs the
question. Does an owner really think that it is a part of her
landed endowment to be able to burn old tires in the back yard?
And if she really thought so at one time, does she now, many
years after the passage of clean air legislation that forbids this
activity? That is, does the passage of time now un-root her ear-
lier expectations? In short, what makes anyone classify some
right as a part of his or her "endowment"?
Coming back to Huang's main thesis, one might ask the same
question about expectations in bargaining. What kind of treat-
ment does a person expect in the bargaining process, such that a
violation of expectations leads her to become angry and to act on
her anger in the course of bargaining? Huang's primary answer
appears to be an analytical one rather than a historical one: one
expects equal treatment, though the expectation of equality may
28 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457,476-77
(1897).
29 R.H. Helmholz, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent, 61 WASH. U. L.Q.
331,356-58 (1983) (noting that judges and juries do not find for knowing trespassers
in adverse possession, whatever the formal law).
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be modified by another factor, namely deservingness.3o
This description of expectations seems to me to be at least
open to question. Several years ago I wrote an article called
"Women and Property," and in that article I tried to work
through some of the ways that women would typically bargain if
they were more inclined to be cooperative than men--or even if
they were simply thought to be more cooperative than men.31 It
is the latter point that is more important: culture and beliefs can
dislodge peoples' expectations from a norm of equality, even
when that norm might be modified by deservingness.32 Indeed,
there is nothing particularly "normal" about the norm of equal
treatment. To use the example that Huang uses, if women are
more cooperative, or if they are simply thought to be more coop-
erative about taking care of children or doing the housework,
then everyone will expect them to do so, even though this means
that they take on an unequal share of the household tasks. Be-
cause of the community norms about who takes care of the kids
and the house, women expect a bad deal, and they get it.33
This fact, however, suggests a somewhat more nuanced rela-
tionship between expectations, emotions, and actions based on
emotions. Consider this same dynamic of inequality in another
context, namely employment relations. In the days before Title
VII, women were routinely paid less for the same work as men,
or they were routinely segregated to positions that paid less than
the pay levels in all-male occupations. Suppose, under those cir-
cumstances, that Allen offers Barbara a job as a waitress, and in
particular he offers her, say, only two-thirds of the amount a
waiter would receive. Barbara may get angry at this, but Barbara
has another cognitive process overlaying her emotional reaction:
if she refuses the job at this pay, will it teach Allen a lesson? The
answer is almost certainly "no." Because of the norm of unequal
pay for women, he will simply think that she is at best weird, or
at worst overreaching in her demands. Moreover, because of the
30 See Huang, supra note 26.
31 Carol M. Rose, Women and Property: Gaining and Losing Ground, 78 VA. L.
REV. 421 (1992).
32 See Robert Sugden, Contractarianism and Norms, 100 ETHICS 768, 779-82
(1990) (disputing constancy of norms of equality, using gender as an example of the
ways culture creates persistent norms of inequality).
33 See also Carol M. Rose, Rhetoric and Romance: A Comment on Spouses and
Strangers, 82 GEO. L.J. 2409, 2414-15 (1994) (arguing that if divorce is a "bad deal"
for women, it is because marriage itself is a bad deal, in which women have lesser
claims on family assets).
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same norm, he can offer the job to some other woman, say Char-
lotte, and Charlotte will accept because she knows that no one is
going to offer her more. Thinking about all of this, Barbara gives
up and accepts, reconfirming Allen's view that he is acting on the
basis of a norm acceptable to all.34
Let me repeat that Barbara may be angry at this treatment,
even though she expects it; I can attest from my own experience
that I certainly was. The situation undoubtedly resembles peo-
ple's reactions to racial slights: these slights still rankle, no mat-
ter how expected they may be.35 But Barbara's anger does not
mean that she will act on her anger. She shares a collective ac-
tion problem with other women; since it does no individual wo-
man any good to protest, all women give in.36 In turn, their
giving in fortifies the very norm that disadvantages them, as well
as their expectation of disadvantage. My point here is that Bar-
bara does act on her expectations, but not necessarily on her
emotions. Her expectations are formed by surrounding norms,
no matter how unjust she may find them.
The most interesting question here is this: what changes
norms? One matter that is surely not the whole explanation, but
nevertheless an important element, is Barbara's outrage, an out-
rage divorced from her realistic expectations about how she will
be treated. A second element is surely the sympathy that she
gets from others--others who, like Barbara, have every expecta-
tion that she will be treated badly but nevertheless lend their
voices to her cause. But her rage and their sympathy are not
based on expectations in any real-world sense. They are based
on a sense of justice.
Where does this sense of justice come from? This is also a
matter with a story. Huang is surely right that in our day and
age, people do expect equal treatment, but this is a historically
contingent expectation. Robert Darnton, an eminent historian of
eighteenth-century France, has pointed out that we have only rel-
atively recently come to think that social relations should be
equal and not hierarchical; until the age of the great revolutions,
the normal view was that human society was by nature ordered in
34 Rose, supra note 31, at 439.
35 See Deborah C. Malamud, Affirmative Action, Diversity, and the Black Middle
Class, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 939, 971, 986 (1997) (describing literature in which black
middle class authors discuss the constant aggravation of racial insults).
36 Sudgen, supra note 32, at 779-82 (describing gender inequality in part as a col-
lective action problem about defying norms).
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a hierarchy, and that things would surely fall apart if superiors
failed to rule inferiors.37 Under those circumstances, unequal
treatment might be accepted with dignity, as a part of the just
order of things; as Tocqueville remarked, the man with the soul
of the lackey is only the one who accepts unequal treatment,
thinking he deserves better.38 As to feminist history specifically,
Linda Kerber has argued that women's unequal status carne to
seem problematic only when hierarchy fell away for everyone
but women.39
In short, in the yang as well as the yin of property, the emo-
tions as well as the rational categories, our attitudes and beliefs
have a history, and they take their place within a historical narra-
tive. As these two excellent papers make clear, one need not
always take a historicizing view in order to say many interesting
things about property; an analytic approach can be very illumi-
nating in its own right. But a narrative often sets a backdrop for
the analytic categories, reaching out behind them into the past.
When we pay attention to that narrative, we can give our analytic
categories some perspective, along with a salutary understanding
of their contingent nature.
37 Robert Darnton, What Was Revolutionary About the French Revolution?, N.Y.
REV. BOOKS, Jan. 19, 1989, at 3, 4; see also CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PER-
SUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP (1994)
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